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California Escrow Agents: A Duty to
Disclose Known Fraud?
In California, most transactions affecting title to real property are
consummated through an escrow.' Escrows have been used as early
as the Blackstonian Era.2 The original doctrine, only referred to the
document delivered to a third person and held until the performance
of the specified conditions.3 Modernly, however, the statutory definition
covers the entire transaction from the time the escrow agent receives
the instructions to the delivery of the conveyance, release of the pur-
chase money to the seller, and payment of commissions to the broker.'
The use of escrows has become indispensable in modern commer-
cial transactions.' Escrows are employed in real estate transactions
as well as transactions involving loans, personal property, and sales
of promissory notes secured by trust deeds.6 The purpose of creating
1. A. Bowman, Real Estate Law in California 368 (1958). CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CODE
§17003 provides:
"Escrow means any transaction where in one person, for the purpose of effecting
the sale, transfer, encumbering, or leasing of real or personal property to another
person, delivers any written instrument, money, evidence of title to real or personal
property, or other thing of value to a third person to be held by such third person
until the happening of a specified event or the performance of a prescribed condi-
tion, when it is then to be delivered by such third person to a grantee, grantor,
promisee, promisor, obligee, obligor, bailee, bailor, or any agent or employee of
any of the latter."
Id.
2. See W. Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law *307 (B. Cavit 2d ed. 1941).
3. Id.
A delivery may be absolute, . . . or to a third person, to hold till some conditions
be performed on the part of the grantee: in which last case it is not delivered as
a deed, but as an escrow, that is, as a scroll or writing, which is not to take effect
as a deed till the conditions be performed; and then it is a deed to all intents and
purposes.
Id.
4. CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CODE §17003 (enacted in 1951 as part of the Escrow Law; ex-
panding the statutory definition of "escrow" to include the entire transaction).
5. Anderson, Escrows as Method of Bringing in and Keeping Customers, 30 Title News
2 (1951).
6. See CALIFORNIA FIANcIAL CODE §17003. Escrows may be used in transactions affecting
real or personal property and may involve conditional delivery of any written instrument, money,
and evidence of title to real or personal property or other thing of value. Id; see, e.g., Bailey
v. Security Trust Co., 179 Cal. 540, 548, 177 P. 444, 447 (1919) (stock certificates); Witmer
Bros. Co. v. Weid, 108 Cal. 569, 574, 41 P. 491, 493 (1895) (promissory notes); Foster v.
Los Angeles Trust & Say. Bank, 36 Cal. App. 460, 462, 172 P. 392, 393 (1918) (money).
The discussion in this comment will be limited to the use of escrows in real property transac-
tions although the concepts discussed extend to other transactions.
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an escrow is to have a neutral third person handle the conflicting
interests of the parties to a transaction. 7
Aware of the growing escrow industry, the state legislature enacted
the California Escrow Law in 1951.8 The purpose of the Escrow Law
is to protect the public from unfair, fraudulent, and incompetent ser-
vice by escrow agents. 9 The Escrow Law accomplishes this goal by
subjecting the escrow industry to licensing requirements and regula-
tion by the Commissioner of Corporations."0 The legislature has
enacted procedural regulations for the protection of the public," but
has failed to define specifically the legal relationship of an escrow
agent to the parties to the escrow arrangement."
Courts have defined the escrow agent's relationship to the parties
as a limited agency.13 In an escrow agreement, the vendor and pur-
chaser are principals and the escrowee is an agent for both parties.' 4
The obligations of the escrow agent, however, are determined solely
by the terms of the escrow agreement.' 5
In contrast, a general agency creates a fiduciary relationship be-
tween a principal and an agent.' 6 As a fiduciary, the agent assumes
a duty to act primarily for the benefit of the principal in matters
connected with the undertaking.' The duty includes: (1) disclosing
material information to the principal;' 8 (2) not competing with the
7. Blackburn v. McCoy, 1 Cal. App. 2d 648, 654-55, 37 P.2d 153, 155 (1935).
8. CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CODE §§17000-17654. The original version of the Escrow Law
was enacted in 1947. The provisions of the act were supplemented and re-enacted in 1951,
making CALIFORNIA F ACIAL CODE §§17000-17654 which is commonly known as the California
Escrow Law. Comment, The Independent Escrow Agent: The Law and the Licensee, 38 So.
CAL. L. REv. 289, 291 (1965).
9. Escrow Institute of California v. Pierno, 24 Cal. App. 3d 361, 366, 100 Cal. Rptr.
880, 883 (1972).
10. Id. CALIFORNIA FIN NCIAL CODE §17006 states that:
Escrow law does not apply to banks, trust companies, building and loan or savings
and loan associations, insurance companies, attorneys not actively engaged in con-
ducting an escrow agency, title insurance companies or real estate brokers while per-
forming acts in the course of or incidental to real estate business because they already
are subject to stringent statutes and regulatory provisions governing the conduct of
their business or profession.
Id.
11. CALRNIA FINANCIAL CODE §§17000-17654.
12. See infra notes 60-172 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Shreeves v. Pearson, 194 Cal. 699, 707, 230 P. 448, 451 (1924).
15. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
16. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §13, comment a (1957).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Menzel v. Salka, 179 Cal. App. 2d 612, 622, 4 Cal. Rptr. 78, 84 (1960);
see W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §106, at 696-97 (4th ed. 1971).
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principal in matters relating to the subject of the agency;19 and (3)
exercising good faith on behalf of the principal. 20
Since the escrow arrangement creates a limited agency, the fiduciary
duty of the escrow agent to disclose material information is limited
to the terms of the escrow instructions. 2' Escrow instructions are
prepared on the escrow agent's printed forms.22 Unless requested by
the parties to the escrow, the instructions generally do not impose
upon the escrow agent a duty to disclose.2 3 Escrow agents, therefore,
may know that a fraud is being committed by one party to the trans-
action and remain silent without incurring liability. 2 The result is that
the parties to the transaction are unprotected.25
In applying breach of fiduciary duty concepts to the limited agency,
courts have confused legal principles and rules. 26 Much of the confusion
stems from whether a cause of action exists for breach of a fiduciary
duty to disclose. 27 Civil Code section 2020 seems to impose a broad
duty to disclose upon an escrow agent.2" California courts, however,
have narrowly construed the escrow agent's duty to disclose.29 Further-
more, California courts have dismissed attempts to create a duty to
disclose known frauds. 30
The purpose of this comment is to examine and clarify the duty
owed by an escrow agent in California to both principals of the agree-
ment. Initially, the history of the struggle to categorize the escrow
agency into various bodies of law with established legal concepts
will be reviewed. 3' The potential causes of action available to a prin-
cipal against an escrow agent will be explored, including breach of
contract, 32 negligence,33 and breach of fiduciary duty.34 In addition,
19. Menzel, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 84; REsTATEMENT (SEco ND) OF AGENCY §13, comment
a (1957).
20. Menzel; 179 Cal. App. 2d at 622, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 84; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§13, comment a (1957).
21. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
22. A. Bowman, Real Estate Law in California 138 (1982).
23. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. See Lee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 160, 163-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. 378,
380 (1968); Blackburn, I Cal. App. 2d at 654, 37 P.2d at 155.
26. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
27. Id.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE §2020.
29. See Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 684, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 667 (1963).
30. See infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
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the different factual situations to which each theory applies will be
illustrated.
An in-depth analysis of the breach of fiduciary duty cases will reveal
the policy behind prior holdings that an escrow agent does not have
a fiduciary duty to disclose." This author will demonstrate that these
policies do not apply if the escrow agent has knowledge that one party
to the escrow is defrauding the other.3 6 One state has expanded the
limited agency theory to include a duty to disclose when the escrow
agent knows that a fraud is being committed by a party to the escrow."
This author proposes that California courts similarly should require
an escrow agent to disclose known frauds.3 First, however, a brief
historical discussion is necessary to understand the difficulty courts
have had in defining the legal status of the escrow agent.
HISTOIuCAL BACKGROUND OF Tim EscRow RELATIONSHIP
Although dicta often state that the escrow agent occupies a "definite
niche in the body of law," the status of an escrow agent is one of
the most anomalous in our system of jurisprudence.39 Descriptions
of the legal status of an escrow agent have been in terms of many
well-defined legal principles, never attaining an independent character.4"
Courts have classified the escrowee as an agent of both parties,4 a
limited or special agent, 42 a trustee of an express trust, 3 both an agent
and a trustee," and a custodian or stakeholder. 5
Commentators have suggested that the legal position of an escrow
agent should be sui generis because of the possible incompatibility
of applying one body of law to another. 6 This possible incompatibility
can be illustrated by two applications of agency law to the escrow
agent.4 7 First, the death of the principal revokes an agency." The
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 173-95 and accompanying text.
37. See id.
38. See infra notes 197-220 and accompanying text.
39. Squire v. Branciforti, 2 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio 1936), see Comment, Escrows-Defalcation
of Escrow Holder, 31 OR. L. REv. 218, 219 (1952).
40. See Comment, supra note 39, at 219.
41. Shreeves, 194 Cal. at 707, 230 P. at 451.
42. Blackburn, I Cal. App. 2d at 654, 37 P.2d at 155.
43. Foulkes v. Sengstacken, 163 P. 311, 314 (Or. 1917).
44. Feisthamel v. Campbell, 55 Cal. App. 774, 781, 205 P. 25, 28 (1921).
45. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Roswell v. Davisson, 229 U.S. 213, 223 (1913).
46. For further discussion of this argument, see Comment, supra note 39, at 219; Com-
ment, A Survey of Escrow-A Legal Adolescent, 8 ARK. L. REV. 164, 171 (1953-54).
47. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
48. See Los Angeles Trust & Say. Bank v. Ward, 197 Cal. 103, 108-09, 239 P. 847, 849
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death of a vendor or vendee to an escrow arrangement, however, does
not terminate the power or duties of the escrow agent. 9 Moreover,
although a principal may revoke an agency, except in the case of
an agency coupled with an interest, the vendor or vendee cannot termi-
nate the escrow.5"
Second, conditional delivery of a deed to the grantee is considered
an absolute delivery upon which title immediately passes.5 Under a
traditional agency theory, therefore, if the escrow agent is the agent
of the grantee, conditional delivery of a deed would be considered
absolute and title would pass immediately.52 The result would be
destruction of the traditional function of the escrow agent.
Similarly, the difficulty of applying trust law to the escrow agent
can be illustrated in two examples." First, delivery of an instrument
in escrow conveys no legal title,"4 whereas delivery in trust shifts legal
title to the trustee.55 Second, a valid trust can be created with an
express power of revocation, 6 whereas a valid escrow cannot be created
if a power of revocation is retained."
The above examples reveal the difficulty of classifying an escrow
relationship under general agency or trust principles.58 Courts,
therefore, generally categorized the escrow relationship as a limited
agency. 9 An analysis of the potential causes of action available against
an escrow agent will be examined to demonstrate the confusion regard-
ing breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose material information.
THEoUs OF LABmLITY
Breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty are
(1925) (the court stated if the escrow agent was only an agent of the grantor, his agency would
cease on the grantor's death).
49. Law v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 91 Cal. App. 621, 630, 267 P. 565, 569 (1968).
50. See H. Miller & M. Starr, Current Law of California Real Estate §12:91 (1977); see
also 3 B. WnrEIN, SUMMARY OF CALrFoRNA LAW, REAL PROPERTY §135, at 1880 (8th ed. 1974).
51. See Comment, supra note 40, at 220.
52. Id. at 220-21.
53. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
54. CAL. Civ. CODE §1057; see, e.g., People v. Hess, 104 Cal. App. 2d 642, 681-82, 234
P.2d 65, 90 (1951) (the court stated that deposit of moneys in an escrow does not alter or
change ownership).
55. Los Angeles Trust & Say. Bank, 197 Cal. at 110-11, 239 P. at 850 (the court conceded
there may be some similarities between an escrow agent and a trustee, but distinguished the
trust situation as where title to the trust property is vested in the trustee).
56. See Comment, supra note 39, at 224.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
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potential causes of action against an escrow agent.60 California courts
consistently have recognized the breach of contract and negligence
theories.6 The courts have recognized that the escrow agent is a
fiduciary and owes a fiduciary duty to the parties to the escrow.
62
The scope of the fiduciary duty, however, has been the subject of
inconsistent analysis.63
The breach of fiduciary duty to disclose theory will be examined
to illustrate the confusion courts have encountered in differentiating
between various legal theories." California Civil Code section 2020
will be discussed to determine the applicability to the escrow agent
and the effect upon the scope of the fiduciary duty. 65 First, however,
an analysis of the breach of contract and negligence theories will illus-
trate the different factual situations to which each theory applies.
A. Breach of Contract and Negligence
Although frequently alleged together, breach of contract and
negligence are two separate and distinct causes of action.66 In Amen
v. Merced County Title Co.,67 the escrow agent received notice from
the state that the purchaser of a tavern was required to obtain a sales
tax clearance certificate. 68 The escrow instructions provided that any
debts should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. 69 The escrow
agent failed to notify the buyer, which resulted in attachment of a
tax lien to the property." The plaintiff brought suit against the escrow
agent alleging breach of contract and negligence." The court held
the defendant liable for the amount of the tax lien under both
theories .72
60. See infra notes 61-172 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 532, 375 P.2d 33, 34,
25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67 (1962) (the court held defendant liable on breach of contract and negligence
theories); Ruth v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 266 Cal. App. 2d 831, 842-43, 72 Cal. Rptr.
521, 529 (1968) (the court held that the defendant was negligent and had breached the escrow
instructions).
62. Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 681-82, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
63. See infra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 109-32 and accompanying text.
66. See Amen, 58 Cal. 2d at 531-32, 375 P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67; Ruth, 266
Cal. App. 2d at 833, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
67. 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33,25 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962).
68. Id. at 531, 375 P.2d at 34, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 530, 375 P.2d at 34, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
72. Id. at 532, 375 P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
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Under the breach of contract theory, an escrow agent has a duty
to comply strictly with the terms of the escrow instructions." The
escrow agent had breached an express provision of the escrow in-
structions by failing to pay the tax lien out of the proceeds of the
sale. 74 Additionally, the court held that the escrow agent had breached
an implied promise by failing to inform the plaintiff of the potential
tax liability.75
Under the negligence theory, an escrow agent has a duty to exer-
cise ordinary skill and diligence in his employment.7 6 The escrow agent
was negligent in failing to inform the plaintiff of the potenial tax
liability." California courts have given consistent treatment to the
recognized causes of action of breach of contract and negligence. 78
The courts have been less consistent, however, when deciding breach
of fiduciary duty claims.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Blackburn v. McCoy 7 was the first California case to determine
the fiduciary duties owed by the escrow agent to the seller and buyer
of real estate."' The plaintiff buyer allegedly was induced to invest
her money through fraudulent misrepresentations that were known
to the escrow agent. 8' The plaintiff further alleged that the escrowee,
her agent, had a duty to disclose information material to her deci-
sion to enter into the transaction." The evidence supported a finding
of fraud and deceit,83 but the court held that the escrow agent was
under no obligation to disclose the information."
Noting the diversity of opinion regarding the escrowee's status as
an agent or trustee for the parties to the escrow, the court held that
the escrowee was an agent." The court concluded, however, that a
73. Id. at 531, 375 P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67; see, e.g., Ruth, 266 Cal. App. 2d
at 839, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
74. Amen, 58 Cal. 2d at 531, 375 P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
75. Id. at 531, 375 P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
76. Id.; see, e.g., Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 173, 217 P.2d
25, 27 (1950).
77. Amen, 58 Cal. 2d at 532, 375 P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
78. E.g., Rianda, 35 Cal. 2d at 173, 217 P.2d at 27; Common Wealth Ins. Systems, Inc.
v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1031, 115 Cal. Rptr. 653, 664 (1974).
79. 1 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 P.2d 153 (1934).
80. Id. at 654-55, 37 P.2d at 155-56.
81. Id. at 650, 37 P.2d at 153.
82. Id. at 654, 37 P.2d at 155.
83. Id. at 657, 37 P.2d at 157.
84. Id. at 655, 37 P.2d at 156.
85. Id. at 654, 37 P.2d at 155; see Comment, supra note 39, at 219.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
general agency did not exist between the parties and the escrow agent.16
An escrow agent owes duties to two parties with conflicting interests."
The court reasoned that the duty to disclose fraud to one principal
conflicts with the duty of loyalty to the other principal.88 The rela-
tionship, therefore, must be classified as a limited agency.8 9 Further-
more, the court concluded the scope of the limited agency was deter-
mined by the express terms of the escrow instructions."
The Blackburn court stated that the purpose of creating an escrow
is to provide a neutral third person to handle conflicting interests of
the parties to a transaction.9' The fundamental principles of loyalty
underlying a general agency, therefore, do not apply in an escrow
situation. 9z The court also noted that an important factor in the
development of the escrow method of handling conveyances is that
the obligations of the escrow agent are limited to the escrow
instructions." Since the escrow instructions did not require the escrow
agent to inform the plaintiff of the fraudulent practices of the defen-
dant, no violation of the duty to disclose was found. 94
Another opportunity for the court to determine the scope of the
escrow agent's fiduciary duty arose in 1968, in Lee v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co.9S The gravamen of the action was the defendant's failure
to disclose a known fraud.96 The plaintiffs alleged that the escrow
agent knew about the fraud but failed to notify them. 97 The court
reaffirmed Blackburn and held that an escrow agent is not liable for
failing to do an act not required by the terms of the escrow.98
The issue presented in Lee was whether an escrow agent is under
a fiduciary duty to go beyond the escrow instructions and notify each
party of suspicious facts or circumstances that arise before or during
the life of the escrow that conceivably could affect a decision to com-
plete the transaction.9" The Lee court stated that imposing a duty






92. See id. at 654-55, 37 P.2d at 155.
93. Id. at 655, 37 P.2d at 155-56; Lee, 264 Cal. App. 2d at 164, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
94. Blackburn, 1 Cal. App. 2d at 655, 37 P.2d at 156.
95. 264 Cal. App. 2d 160, 70 Cal. Rptr. 378.
96. Id. at 161, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 163-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 380. Contra Berry v. McLeod, 604 P.2d 610, 616 (Ariz.
1979).
99. Lee, 264 Cal. App. 2d at 162, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
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to disclose on an escrow agent would create a dilemma.' Once in-
formation was received, the escrow agent would be forced to decide
whether to believe and disclose or disbelieve and conceal the
knowledge.' 0 ' If the knowledge is concealed, the escrow agent risks
suit for breach of fiduciary duty to disclose a known fraud.0 2 If the
information is disclosed, but is inaccurate, all parties to the escrow
may sue the escrow agent for interference with the contract.0 3 Further-
more, the court in Lee stated that subjecting escrow agents to a high
risk of litigation would damage a valuable business procedure. 04 A
judicially imposed duty to disclose would discourage a reasonably pru-
dent person from acting as an escrow agent. 5 Ultimately, the very
purpose for which escrows originated would be defeated because the
escrow agent would lose his neutrality.0 6
In Blackburn and Lee, the courts held that no duty to disclose
known fraud exists unless required by the terms of the escrow
instructions.' 7 Crucial to the analysis in those cases was the fact that
the escrow instruction lacked an express provision creating an affir-
mative duty to disclose.0 8 In contrast, California Civil Code section
2020 imposes a duty upon the escrow agent to exercise ordinary care
to communicate information to a principal. 09 The escrow agent must
reveal knowledge of material facts acquired in the course of his agency
that might affect the decision of the principal in a pending
transaction.' '°
The language seems to require a broad duty to disclose."' The
courts, however, have construed section 2020, a general agency pro-
vision, consistently with the notion of a limited agency." 2 The fiduciary
duty to communicate with the principal under section 2020, therefore,
is limited to knowledge acquired under the terms of the escrow
agreement." 3 Spaziani v. Millar' '4 is illustrative of the application of
section 2020.






106. See id.; see Blackburn, I Cal. App. 2d at 654-55, 37 P.2d at 155-56.
107. See supra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. CAL. CIV. CODE §2020. An agent must use ordinary diligence to keep his principal
informed of his acts in the course of his agency. Id.
110. Id.; Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. at 684, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
111. See CAL. CrV. CODE §2020.
112. Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. at 684, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
113. Id.
114. 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963).
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In Spaziani, the plaintiff had given the escrow agent indefinite and
ambigious instructions. ' 5 The escrow agent knew that the first deed
of trust was to secure a construction loan and subsequently learned
that the loan was a purchase assistance loan." 6 Furthermore, the agent
knew the terms of repayment were different than those agreed upon
in the deposit receipt." '7 The escrow agent allowed the escrow to close
without communicating the information to the plaintiff." 8 The court
held the defendant was negligent and had breached the fiduciary duty
owed to the plaintiff."19
In reaching this decision, the court relied upon Civil Code section
2020.120 The court stated that section 2020 imposes a duty upon agents
to exercise ordinary care in communicating knowledge acquired in
the course of an agency to the principal.' 2' Since the type of loan
required was within the terms of the escrow instructions, the escrow
agent had a duty to disclose the information to the plaintiff.
12
The Spaziani court summarized the existing legal theory regarding
escrow agents in California.'23 California law provides that an escrowee
is the agent of all parties prior to performance of the conditions of
the escrow.' 24 An escrow agent bears a fiduciary relationship to each
party. 25 The court also stated the obligations of the escrow agent
to each party are measured by application of ordinary agency
principles.' 26 The reference to ordinary agency principles suggests an
escrow is similar to a general agency. 27 The court qualified the
reference, however, by stating that the escrow agent's duty to disclose
must be viewed in light of the nature of the existing fiduciary
relationship. 121
The nature of the fiduciary relationship between the escrow agent
115. Id. at 681, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
116. Id. at 681-82, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
117. Id. at 683, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 684, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
120. ld.
121. Id; see Contini, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 547, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
122. See Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 683, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
123. Id. at 682-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67; see, e.g., Amen, 58 Cal. 2d at 531-32, 275
P.2d at 35, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 67; Rianda, 35 Cal. 2d at 173, 217 P.2d at 27.
124. Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666; Shreeves, 194 Cal. at 707,
230 P. at 451.
125. Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666; Amen, 58 Cal. 2d at 534,
375 P.2d at 54, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
126. Spaziani, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 684, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
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and the parties limits the duty to disclose to strict compliance with
the escrow instructions. 29 An escrow agent disposing of property in
violation of instructions will be responsible for any resulting loss. 3 '
Section 2020 apparently applies to an escrow if the information is
found to be within the terms of the escrow instructions.' 3 ' An escrow
agent, therefore, must exercise ordinary skill and diligence in employ-
ment or be held liable for any loss caused by acts in violation of
the duty.' 32 Other courts, however, have not followed Spaziani.
In Gordon v. D & G Escrow Corp.,'33 title to the property in escrow
was held in the name of the plaintiff's estranged wife.' 34 The plaintiff
and his estranged wife, however, both had executed the escrow
instructions.' When escrow closed, the escrow agent distributed all
of the proceeds to the wife.'36 The court refused to recognize a cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty.' 31 The defendant, however,
was held liable under a breach of contract theory.' 38 The court found
an implied promise that, an escrow agent must disburse the proceeds
of the sale to the sellers absent express instructions to the contrary. 39
In dictum, the court stated that the refusal to impose a duty to
disclose was based on two factors.' 40 First, the Gordon court relied
upon an express disclaimer of liability in the escrow instructions.' 4 '
The clause disclaimed any liability for failure to inform the plaintiff
of facts known to the escrow agent that were not required for com-
pliance with the escrow instructions."42 Second, the court relied upon
Lee to hold that the escrow agent had no duty to disclose the fraud
by the estranged wife. ' 43 The court failed, however, to distinguish
the facts in Gordon from the facts in Lee.' 44 In Lee, the plaintiff
alleged the escrow agent had a duty to disclose known fraud even
129. Id. at 682, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
130. Id. at 682-83, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. 48 Cal. App. 3d 616, 122 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1975).
134. Id. at 619, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 620, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
137. Id. at 623, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
138. Id. at 621, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
139. Id.
140. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
141. Gordon, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 622-23, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
142. Id.
143. Lee, 264 Cal. App. 2d at 163, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
144. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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though disclosure was not required by the terms of the escrow. 4 The
court held an escrow agent is not required to go beyond the terms
of the escrow instructions in disclosing information.' 6 In Gordon,
however, the plaintiff alleged the escrow agent owed a duty to disclose
information that arose within the terms of the escrow agreement. 47
In Spaziani, the court relied upon section 2020 to impose upon the
escrow agent a duty to disclose information that arose within the terms
of the escrow agreement. 4 ' In analyzing Gordon, therefore, the court
should have followed Spaziani and was incorrect in applying Lee to
avoid finding a fiduciary duty to disclose.'4 9
In Schaefer v. Manufacturers Bank,'1° the court again used a Lee
analysis to deny a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In this case,
the plaintiff decided to contract directly with the purchaser.'", The
plaintiff's purpose in dealing outside the escrow was to give up only
$35,000 in cash in favor of three trust deeds having apparent values
of $85,650.' Later, when the deeds of trust proved worthless,
however, the plaintiff alleged the escrow agent had breached the
fiduciary duty.' 53 The court dismissed the action stating that the loss
was due to transactions entered into outside of the escrow."' The
court relied on Blackburn and Lee in analyzing the duty of the escrow
agent.'"s
Significantly, the court failed to acknowledge that in Blackburn and
Lee the plaintiffs alleged that the escrow agent had knowledge of the
fraud.' ,56 In Schaefer, the plaintiff failed to allege that the escrow
agent knew that the trust deeds were worthless."5 7 The plaintiff,
therefore, in effect, was arguing for extension of the fiduciary duty
to include a duty to investigate and know the value of trust deeds." 8
In Blackburn, the plaintiff sought to expand the limited agency to
145. Lee, 264 Cal. App. at 161, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
146. Id. at 163, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
147. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
150. 104 Cal. App. 3d 70, 163 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1980).
151. Id. at 72-3 n.1, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.1.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 73, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 77, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
156. See Blackburn, I Cal. App. 2d at 657, 37 P.2d at 157; Lee, 264 Cal. App. 2d at
161, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
157. See Schaefer, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 76-77, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
158. Id.
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include a duty to disclose known frauds.'" In Schaefer, the argu-
ment of the plaintiff went far beyond a limited agency theory or a
duty to disclose known frauds. 160 The court, therefore, was correct
in rejecting the argument.
Various theories of liability available against an escrow agent have
been discussed.' 6' Under a breach of contract theory, an escrow agent
has a duty to comply strictly with the terms of the escrow
instructions.' 62 Under a negligence theory, an escrow agent has a du-
ty to exercise ordinary skill and reasonable diligence in his
employment.' 63 Under a breach of fiduciary duty to disclose theory
the law is muddled.'
64
The reason for the confusion is evident from the case law.' 65 The
courts have failed both to distinguish the factual situations under which
the arguments have been raised and to differentiate between the appro-
priate legal theories.'66 In Blackburn and Lee, the courts held the
escrow agent has no duty to disclose a known fraud because disclosure
was not required by the terms of the instructions.' 67 In Spaziani, the
court held that the information was within the terms of the escrow
agreement.' 68 The escrow agent, therefore, had a duty to disclose under
Civil Code section 2020.169
Finally, in Schaefer, the court held an escrow agent has no duty
to disclose an unknown fraud if disclosure is not required by the terms
of the instructions.' 70 California courts, therefore, only recognize a
breach of fiduciary duty in the Spaziani situation.' 7' Another jurisdic-
tion, however, has expanded the limited agency concept to include
a duty to disclose known frauds.'72
ARIZONA ExPANDs Tlm LIMITED AGENCY
California does not impose a duty to disclose known fraud upon
159. Blackburn, I Cal. App. 2d at 655, 37 P.2d at 156.
160. See Schaefer, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 77, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
161. See supra notes 60-172 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 79-160 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 115-32 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Schaefer, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 78, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
171. Id at 77, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 407; see supra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 173-95 and accompanying text.
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an escrow agent.' 73 Prior to the 1979 Arizona Supreme Court deci-
sion in Berry v. McLeod,' 71 Arizona law was consistent with California
law.'7 1 In Berry, the plaintiff contracted to sell a parcel of land shortly
before his death.' 76 Unknown to the plaintiff, the buyer was a cor-
poration the real estate brokers of the plaintiff established to resell
the land. 177 The escrow agent set up simultaneous back-to-back
escrows'78 and the brokers of the plaintiff reaped an illegal secret
profit.' 79 The escrow agent allegedly knew of the scheme.' 80 After
the plaintiff's death, his personal representative brought an action
alleging negligence in the administration of the escrow and a viola-
tion of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose a known fraud.,'
The negligence action was dismissed, but the court recognized a
breach of fiduciary duty to disclose known frauds.'812 The Berry court
expanded the duty of the escrow agent by requiring disclosure of facts
that, if unrevealed, would assist in perpetrating a fraud against a party
to the escrow. 83 The court expressly stated that an escrow agent has
no duty to investigate for fraud.'" Furthermore, liability must be based
upon evidence that the escrow agent had actual knowledge of the fraud
and failed to disclose the information to the parties. " 5
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized the rationale behind the
reluctance of California courts, as expressed in Lee, to create a duty
of disclosure.'8 6 The court, however, stated that fear of an increased
risk of litigation is sound only up to a point. 8 7 Absent fraud, the
173. See supra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
174. 604 P.2d 610 (Ariz. 1979).
175. See Comment, Escrowees' Duty to Disclose Fraud: An Expansion of the Limited Agency
Doctrine, 22 ARiz. L. REv. 1146, 1150 (1980).
176. 604 P.2d at 612. The court acknowledged that the facts were in serious dispute, but
nonetheless assumed the allegations of the plaintiff concerning the existence of the fraud were
true for the purpose of legal analysis. Id. at 616.
177. Id. at 614.
178. Id. A "back to back" or "double" escrow is used when a person sells property that
he does not own, but has a right to purchase by virtue of a purchase agreement or option.
H. Miller & M. Starr, supra note 50, §12:83, at 395. As long as the intermediary buyer-seller
is not an agent of one of the parties, and as long as there is no other misrepresentation, the
use of the "double" escrow is a legitimate transaction. Id. The evidence used by the court
indicated that in Berry, McLeod's brokers were using the "double" escrow illegally since they
also were acting as MeLeod's agents. Berry, 604 P.2d at 614.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 616.
181. Id. at 614.
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activities of real estate investors and speculators are legitimate.'88 The
escrow agent has no duty to regulate the transaction so that each
party receives a fair price for the property.'89 Nor is the agent a guar-
dian for the uninitiated. 9 On the other hand, the escrow agent should
not assist in the perpetration of fraud by silence.' 9'
By expanding the duty to disclose to include known fraufds, the
Arizona court determined that protecting the parties to an escrow from
fraud is part of the very purpose for which escrows are created.'
92
The Berry court, however, limited the additional protection afforded
the parties by requiring only disclosure of known fraud, thereby
minimizing the burden placed on the escrow agent. 93 The policy deci-
sion made by the court is that parties to the escrow should not be
defrauded when the escrow agent has knowledge of the fraud.'
94
Expansion of the limited agency to include a duty to disclose known
frauds will not unduly burden the escrow agent. 95 The policy deci-
sion by the Arizona court indicates that protecting the parties to an
escrow from a known fraud outweighs the potential increase of liability
of escrow agents. 96 In contrast, California courts have rejected the
policy decision of the Arizona courts.
RECOMMENDATIONS
California should follow the Arizona lead and expand the fiduciary
duty of the escrow agent to include disclosure of known frauds. Three
alternate methods to expand the traditional limited agency in California
to include a fiduciary duty to disclose known fraud now will be discussed.
Application of the Arizona judicial expansion in California also will
be examined. Additionally, the insertion of an express duty to disclose
provision in the escrow instructions will be explored as a means of
modifying the existing California rule. Finally, the feasibility of ex-
panding the fiduciary duty through legislation will be analyzed.
California cases have refused to adopt a duty to disclose on the
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use of a general agency. '97 The rationale for this position is that a
general agency creates a fiduciary relationship between the principal
and the agent.'98 As a fiduciary, the agent assumes a duty to act
primarily for the benefit of the principal in matters connected with
the undertaking.'99 The duty includes disclosing information material
to the interests of the principal. 2°0 The courts have determined that
the duties of the escrow agent to each party would be conflicting
and, therefore, have rejected the duty to disclose.21
Additionally, the court in Lee explained the potential dangers of
requiring disclosure by escrow agents.22 The dangers include the dif-
ficult position of an escrow agent when uncertainty exists as to whether
fraud is occurring. 203 Requiring the escrow agent to reveal knowledge
that later proved to be inaccurate could subject the escrow agent to
liability for interference with the contract of the principal.2 4 On the
other hand, a failure to disclose information later found fraudulent
would subject the escrow agent to suit for failure to disclose a known
fraud. 20 5 Furthermore, the court was concerned that requiring disclosure
of known fraud effectively might discourage a reasonable person from
acting as an escrow agent.20 6 Ultimately, the very purpose for which
escrows originated might be defeated.20 7
The issue presented in Lee went beyond a duty to disclose known
frauds.20 8 The court phrased the issue in terms of whether the escrowee
is under a fiduciary duty to go beyond the terms of the instructions
and notify each party of suspicious facts that conceivably could af-
fect their decisions. 209 The Berry decision does not require the escrow
agent to investigate for suspicious facts that might affect the deci-
sions of the parties. 210 Rather, Berry limited the duty to the disclosure
of known frauds.2"'
197. See supra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
198. Restatement (Second) of Agency §13, comment a (1957).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Menzel v. Salka, 179 Cal. App. 2d at 622, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 84; W. Prosser,
supra note 18, at 696-97.
201. See supra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, Lee states that an expansion of the duty ultimately
would defeat the very purpose for which escrows originated.21 2 The
purpose of creating an escrow is for the seller and buyer to have
a third person handle their conflicting interests and adequately pro-
tect the rights of each party to the transaction.2"3 Nondisclosure of
known frauds results in the parties being unprotected. Since escrows
are set up to provide protection, the duty to disclose should be ex-
panded. In Berry, the Arizona Supreme Court extended the duty of
the escrow agent to include disclosure of known fraud, thereby pro-
viding an alternative to the California rule.21 4
The court in Berry held that the duty to disclose information not
required by the escrow agreement exists only if the escrow agent knows
that a fraud is being committed on a party to the escrow. 215 The
holding does not require the escrow agent to investigate for fraud.216
The escrow agent, therefore, faces the possibility of liability for re-
maining silent only in situations in which an ordinary and prudent
escrowee would be put on notice of impending fraud.217 The court
emphasized the limited nature of the expansion. Nevertheless, the court
determined that protection of the parties to the escrow demands that
escrow agents not assist in the perpetration of fraud by silence.
An alternative to judicial adoption of a fiduciary duty to disclose
known fraud is the creation of an express duty in the escrow
agreement. 218 An express clause is consistent with the California reason-
ing that an implied duty to disclose fraud is contrary to the very nature
and purpose of an escrow agreement. 2' 9 An express duty to disclose
known frauds, therefore, would retain the concept of a limited agency
subject only to the terms of the escrow. At the same time, the harsh
effect of known frauds going undetected by a party to the escrow
would be eliminated. This proposal, therefore, would provide a cause
of action to both principals against the escrow agent for breach of
contract.
The problem with a contractual provision, however, is that the
escrow agent furnishes an important public service and has superior
212. Lee, 264 Cal. App. 2d at 163, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
213. Id.
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bargaining power. Furthermore, the forms provided by the escrow
agent are standardized. The escrow agent may be unwilling to include
an express duty to disclose known frauds within the escrow agree-
ment. Since the use of escrows is virtually indispensable in modern
real estate transactions, the parties may have no choice but to use
the provisions provided by the escrow agent. Once again the parties
would be unprotected from known fraud.
Still another method of providing protection to the parties from
known fraud is legislative action. The Berry rule could be codified
to state expressly that the liability of an escrow agent must be based
upon evidence of actual knowledge of the fraud and failure to disclose
the information to the parties. Since no duty exists to investigate for
fraud the limited agency merely is expanded, not abolished.
CONCLUSION
This author has examined California cases that struggle with the
precise nature of the duties of the escrow agent. These courts have
rejected imposing a duty to disclose upon escrow agents based on
the rationale that disclosure is not required absent an express clause
in the escrow instructions. Furthermore, the courts fear increased litiga-
tion against escrow agents who perform an important public service.
The Arizona Supreme Court has expanded the fiduciary duty of the
escrow agent to include disclosure of known frauds. The Berry court
determined that the difficulties envisioned in California case law would
not materialize. Furthermore, sound public policy dictates that escrow
agents should not silently watch a party to the escrow be defrauded.
This author has established that California should follow the Berry
expansion of the limited agency to include a duty to disclose known
frauds. Possible mechanisms to achieve this expansion include judicial
adoption, enactment of legislation or express contractual provisions.
Creating a duty to disclose only known frauds will not destroy the
nature of the escrow relationship. Escrow agents will not become guar-
dians for the uninitiated. For the benefit of honest escrow agents and
protection of the parties to an escrow, the California courts should
follow the Arizona lead and impose a duty upon the escrow agent
to disclose known frauds.
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